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anyone since Keynes himself. In numerous articles and books
Minsky (1975,1982,1986)  has argued that in an environment of
Keynesian uncertainty, expectations will be subject to endogenous
cyclical instability and, as a result, investment will be
cyclically unstable as well.
Though Minsky has chosen not to develop mathematical models
to embody his theoretical insights, substantial progress along
these lines has been made in recent years. In particular, formal
models of Minsky cycles incorporating the interaction of
investment and financial variables at the macro or general
equilibrium level have been developed by Delli Gatti and
Gallegati (1990), Jarsulic (19891, Semmler (19871, Semmler and
Franke (1991), Skott (1991) and Taylor and O'Connell (1985).
However, work on a theory of the enterprise investment decision
that can provide a microeconomic foundation for such Keynes-
Minsky macromodels has been relatively neglected.
One reason for this lack of progress at the micro level may
be Minsky's adoption of Tobin's q-theory in which there is no
independent firm decision-making process. Another is that the
core assumptions of a Keynesian world make the process of
formalization difficult. As explained in Section I of this
paper, a Keynesian investment theory requires not only that the
future be unknowable, but that investment be substantially
irreversible as well. Either assumption considered in isolation2
presents substantial analytical difficulty; taken together they
are formidable.' But real-world firms do accumulate illiquid
capital in conditions of Keynesian uncertainty. Our challenge,
then, is to construct a tractable theory of the investment
decision that incorporates these two Keynesian assumptions. This
paper offers one attempt to meet this challenge.
Section I presents an overview of the model, which is fully
specified in Section II. Section III discusses the firm's .
optimal investment strategy, while Section IV discusses the
comparative static properties of that policy. Section V then
explains how the model can be used to micro found a Minsky cycle.
I. An Overview of the Model
This section presents an overview of the firm's investment
decision. For convenience, all notation is defined in Table I.
We turn first to the characterization of the enterprise as a .
behavioral agent. Keynes and Minsky have taken opposite
positions with respect to owner-manager relations.' Minsky
generally accepts a variant of Tobin's q-theory in which owners
and managers are assumed to be identical economic agents: there
is no independent enterprise decision-making process. Keynes, on
the other hand, insists on the qualitative differentiation of
stockholders (and financial investors generally)
managers.
and enterprise
We follow Keynes's lead here. His approach is, in fact,consistent with the spirit of Minsky's model. Since Minsky
rejects the neoclassical approach to uncertainty, it would be
logical for him to assume that distinct agents such as owners and
managers have both incomplete and asvmmetric information. As
Keynes stressed, managers know more about the firm and its
environment than do the firm's stockholders.3 Moreover, as
discussed in Crotty (1990), there are compelling reasons to
assume that owners and managers have qualitatively different
objective functions as well as different planning horizons.4
The theory of the semiautonomous firm is most highly
developed in the managerial and behavioral theoretical tradition.
We accept the standard assumption of this literature that
management seeks the reproduction, growth and security of the
enterprise itself, and through these goals, its own income,
status and job security.' Stockholder and creditor interests
are not objectives pursued by management. Rather, they represent
a potential threat to management's decision-making autonomy and a
constraint on the pursuit of its objectives. To protect its
control of the enterprise, the firm must pay dividends sufficient
to prevent a share holders' revolt or a corporate raid and
interest payments that prevent creditors from constraining
managerial autonomy.
More formally, we assume that the firm maximizes a
preference function O(G,S) where G reflects the growth-profit
objectives of the enterprise and S embodies management's concern
for the financial security of the firm and thus for its own4
decision-making autonomy -- it financial securitv-autonomv
objective. Both G and S are functions of the capital stock
trajectory over management's long-term planning horizon. We make
G a function of two subgoals: R', the present value of the future
earnings the firm expects its capital stock to generate (which
depends on the pattern of future demand and cost conditions it
expects); and K', the average size of the capital stock over the
planning horizon -- an index of the size-status of the firm.6
S is an index of the likelihood that management will
experience a threat to its autonomy. This threat exists because
growth can only be obtained through the accumulation of illiquid
capital and capital accumulation must be financed. Debt finance
creates explicit, legally-binding cash-flow commitments to
creditors. But even internal funding and stock floatation create
implicit cash-flow commitments to shareholders. When investment
is irreversible, these financial commitments are irreversible as
well. When expectations are disappointed, the firm cannot simply
repay its creditors with the proceeds from the resale of the
assets they financed. If commitments to stockholders cannot be
met out of the future operating profits generated by invested
capital, management may experience a threat to its decision-
making autonomy; if commitments to creditors are not met, the
firm might go bankrupt.
In a Keynesian-Minskian world, financial commitments to
creditors are relatively certain while expected profits are not,5
To make sensible decisions about the accumulation of long-lived
illiquid capital, then, the firm must form expectations of cash
flows well into the future. But about such matters, Keynes told
USI '*We simply do not know". When investment is irreversible and
the future is unknowable, irreversible mistakes of serious
maqnitude are Possible. It is the irreversibility of investment
which creates the "legacy of past contracts@'  (Minsky, 1982, p.
63) that constrain current investment and threaten managerial
autonomy. Thus, while accumulation is necessarv (to achieve
growth), it is simultaneously danserous for management. To
specify S more concretely, let X, be defined as the interest plus
dividend payments necessary to preserve managerial autonomy
(i.e., as the costs of autonomy) and let Z, be defined as the ex
post gross profits available to meet these payments in period t.
A threat to autonomy will arise when (&-X,) is expected to be
small; a crisis will occur if (IS,-X,)  is expected to be negative.
The firm will want to avoid investment decisions which cause
expectations of (xt-X,) to become uncomfortably low. Suppose
that we provisionally adopt the neoclassical assumption that the
firm can, with complete confidence, form subjective probability
distributions relating future profit flows to the size of the -
capital stock in each future period. Denote the expected
distribution of K given K (or IcIK) in any period as f,. The
perceived likelihood of an autonomy crisis would then be given by
F t, the cumulative probability that ?'cTc, < X,, and S(F,) would then
represent the firm's index of expected safety in t. Under this6
treatment of uncertainty, management's estimate of the likelihood
of an autonomy crisis in period t would depend on: (1) the
financial structure of the firm at the end of period (t-l) --
.
Minsky's "legacy of past contractstV; (2) f,, management's
subjective probability distribution for IC, given its choice of
Kt; and (3) the value of K, selected by the firm. Since today's
investment decision affects future expected net revenues, the
future costs of autonomy and the future financial structure of
the firm, it inevitablv alters the relation of K to both G and S
in future Periods. Thus, the capital accumulation problem
confronting management is inherently dynamic.
There are two reasons why this formulation of the problem is
inadequate for our purposes. First, if we were to include the
complete set of functions S(F,), S(F,+l),  . . . S(F,) in the
objective function, the dynamic effects of today's investment
decision would be extraordinarily complex because the firm's
future financial commitments would be a complicated function of
the K trajectory with an exponentially increasing number of
stochastic terms: this formulation is analytically intractable.
Second, as noted, it incorporates a neoclassical treatment of
uncertainty.
In Appendix B (which should be consulted after reading
Section II and Appendix A), we show that there does exist a
tractable static variant of the firm's investment decision under
Keynesian uncertainty that is equivalent to the full dynamic
model just enumerated under a set of three assumptions that are7
both realistic and consistent with a Keynesian worldview.'
First, we assume that the firm adopts a sequential decision-
making process in which it tentatively chooses an optimal capital
stock trajectory each period but only orders the first period's
capital goods at that time. It then updates its forecasts of
future demand and cost conditions using data generated during the
first period and re-evaluates the G(K) and S(K) functions before
repeating the process. When errors can be extremely costly and
when the forecasts on which beyond-period optimal capital stock
decisions are based may be dramatically revised in the light of
data generated in the current period, management will not want to
commit itself beyond its "next best step" (Vickers, 1987, p. 8)
on the basis of current data.
Second, the assumption of Keynesian uncertainty suggests
that as the planning horizon lengthens, the firm's confidence in
its ability to predict the precise form of the effects of today's
investment on future growth and safety declines dramatically. We
incorporate this phenomenon in our model by assuming: (1) that
the firm can construct a neoclassical-type subjective probability
distribution describing the effect of K on expected gross profits
for the coming three to five year corporate planning cycle that
we take as the length of a period*; and (2) that the firm does
not believe that it has enough reliable information to fully
specify all future S(F,) functions, so it cannot optimize over
the beyond-first-period effects of current investment on the S
function.8
Third, we confine our analysis to the case where, in the G
function, the firm expects a constant and non-negative time rate
of growth of its product demand curve. Note carefully that
assumptions two and three imply that the optimal stock is
expected to grow each period and that there is no incentive in
the model to over-invest now in anticipation of future growth.
Thus, the optimal stocks of capital in future periods are
independent of this period's stock and of each other.
These assumptions simplify the problem, but they also imply
that S is a function of F, alone: the firm is oblivious to the
existence and not just to the precise form of the beyond-first-
period effect of investment on safety.g To insure that the firm
takes the existence and potential significance of the "legacy" of
future financial commitments created by current investment fully
into account and to guarantee that it does not blindly pursue
short-term growth and safety at the expense of its lons-term
financial security objectives, we respecify S as S(F,D') where D'
is an index of the firm's current perception of its long-term
financial vulnerability. We define D' as (D-B), where D is the
current level of debt and b is the maximum debt level that
management is comfortable carrying into its uncertain future.'O
The inclusion of D' in S forces the firm's current
investment decision to be consistent with its long-term safety
objective. 8 reflects managerial optimism or pessimism. The
brighter the firm's expectations of the long-term future, the9
larger the debt burden it is willing to accept and, ceteris
paribus, the more it is willing to invest now. Conversely, when
B is low and D' is high, the firm will be less likely to take on
the additional long-term financial commitments associated with
current investment even if short-term investment prospects as
reflected in F do not look immediately threatening. Note that
the use of a conventional, rule-of-thumb variable such as b
constitutes a very Keynesian solution to this long-term aspect of
the uncertainty problem.
This specification of the S function is ideally suited to
underpin Minsky's theory of investment instability because both F
and D' are subjective, conventionally-constituted variables that
can shift endogenously as managerial optimism and management's
confidence in its ability to forecast the future ebb and flow
with the business cycle. To use Minskian  terms, we might say
that F and D' represent, respectively, the firm's short-term and
long-term perceptions of financial fragility.ll
Thus, in a world characterized by our assumptions,
Maximize
0 [G(R(I;K*), K(I;K') 1, S (F(I;K'), D' (I;K'? 11 (1)
(where R is expected net revenue, I is net investment, K" is the
initial capital stock, the relation between I and K is treated
implicitly as K( I;K'), and all variables are current) is a
sensible Keynesian-Minskian specification because the firm has: a
long-term planning horizon; is aware that its current investment
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and believes that only the short-term future can be forecast with
any degree of confidence,
This brings us to the core of management's decision-making
problem: the orowth-safety tradeoff. Were the firm to undertake
only those investment projects with very high expected profits,
it might be able to raise G and S simultaneously. But as it
pushes capital accumulation to the point which maximizes G, it
will accept projects with decreasing expected profitability
and/or higher risk. It will, at the margin, lower S by raising F
(the likelihood that IC will fall short of X in the coming period)
and increasing D' (and thus the likelihood a long-term autonomy
crisis).l* On the other hand, if the firm minimizes its
vulnerability to autonomy crises by accepting only the safest
projects, it will forego.expected growth opportunities. We
explore this growth-safety tradeoff in detail below.
Investment, then, is a function of: (1) the determinants of
the relation between expected profits and K; (2) the determinants
of the relationship between expected safety and K; and (3)
management's relative preference for growth versus safety. All
three of these relations are subject to Keynesian-Minskian
endogenous instability. After deriving the comparative static
properties of the optimal investment decision in Section IV, we
demonstrate that Minsky's stylized facts describing the typical
business cycle will indeed induce cyclical investment instability
in the model described here and fully specified in Section II.11
II. The Model
We complete our modelling of the firm's investment problem
by more fully specifying the R,K,F and D/ functions
(1). In the remainder of the paper, the superscript
to end-of-last period values.




difference between expected gross profits, 1sg, and the present
discounted value (PDV) of debt payments (costs of autonomy
abstracting from dividend payments for the moment), A, associated
with current gross investment:
R=xg(K(I;K”)) - A(K(I;p)) (2)
The level of A is determined by the financing mechanism of
the firm. We assume that the representative firm is a net debtor
with no liquid assets and with only two sources of investment
finance: the internal funds or cash-flow carried over from last
period and new debt in the event that gross investment
expenditures exceed cash flow. When cash flow exceeds gross
investment outlays, the residual goes to debt reduction. All
debt is assumed to be variable rate consoles.
Since gross investment expenditure, PKIg, is either debt
financed or financed from cash-flow residuals which would
otherwise be
cost, direct
used for debt reduction, the additional interest
and/or opportunity, associated with P'crg is rPKIg
where PK is the price of a unit of capital. A is the present
discounted value of rPKIg. A formal specification of the
financing and dividend payout mechanisms and thier implications12
for the debt structure and R function is contained in Appendix A.
In order to avoid the reintroduction of future effects into
Problem (11, dividends are defined as a percentage, p, of
current gross profits minus last period's interest payments (see
Appendix A). Further, to simplify the expression of the
optimizing conditions associated with (l), dividends are treated
as a seperate entity from the other costs of autonomy --  A, the
PDV of debt payments.
ng(K(I;p))  can be further decomposed as follows. We assume
a fixed-coefficient, constant variable cost production function
and a downward-sloping demand curve: Q = Q (K), P = P(Q(K) ) and
C7=b where Q is output, P is expected output price, U is expected
unit variable cost and 77 is a constant. We further assume that
P, < 0 and P,, s 0. Given, these assumptions we can alternatively
specify TC.Q(K(T;~))  as ar(K(I;KO))Q(K) where dc = (P - U) is the
firm's markup on unit variable cost. Thus, xf = apI + Qa, and
QI = P&.
Given that PO < 0 , XT is sign indeterminate. Moreover, the
inclusion of the K subobjective in G and the S objective in 0
implies that the first order conditions for the maximization of 0
are not capable of restricting R,>O by equating x: and A, (or
marginal revenue and marginal cost) as in the neoclassical
treatment. While size considerations may drive investment to the
point where marginal gross profits are less than the marginal
costs of autonomy, financial security objectives may limit
investments such that (l-p)xf>A,  where p is the dividend payout13
rate. Thus, in equilibrium R, '( 0 ds (1-p) JC:; A,.
The firm's size subobjective is simply specified by K(I;K'),
the size of the firm's real capital stock, and thus needs no
further elaboration. In addition, K, = 1.
We turn now to the S subobjectives, F and D'. F is the
probability that 1~ < X -- the likelihood of an autonomy crisis.
F can be;xpressed as:
F=I
f  (x; Tcg(K (I;Ko)), al) d?r
where: f 4s the firm's subjective pseudo-probability distribution
of x, the uncertain gross profit flows; ~cg(K(I;fl>)  and u2 are
the mean and variance of x; a is the lower limit of YC, X is the
firm's current financial obligations (costs of autonomy) as
distinct from the present value of the costs of autonomy, A. For
ease of exposition, we assume that x is distributed uniformly.13
Given that f is uniform, a = a(@(K); u2) with aa -=l and
a+
*<o ad l
The sign of F,=(X,-?rf)  f depends on the relationship between
(1+x: and X, which is similar, but not identical, to the
relation between x7 and A,. If (l-p,xq',  x,, FI>'O. In the case
where xF>O, a one unit increase in I can increase expected gross
profit flows by either more or less than the increase in current
autonomy payments and thus either decrease or increase the
probability of short-term financial strife.
As noted above, D/--D-8 where B is the product of f and
(PXK(I;fl),  f is the maximum leverage ratio considered safe or
prudent by management, and PKK (I;K") represents the value of
the firm's assets. L7 Since E=- ,
PKK
it can be thought of as the14
maximum acceptable debt to debt-plus-equity ratio. As noted (fn.
121, an increase in Ig will always raise D by more than the
marginal increase in the "admissible" level of long-term debt
emanating from the increase in the firm's K. Thus, investment
always initiallv increases the firm's long-term debt dependencv
and therefore reduces securitv.
In order to simplify notation, we respectively define a
series of vectors that contain the relevant exogenous parameters
for the R, X, a, D and 1s functions: F,F,g,E and d. These
vectors are fully specified in Appendix A and include the
dividend payout rate, the interest rate, the price of a unit of
capital, the depreciation rate, the maximum acceptable debt to
debt-plus-equity ratio, and the initial values of the stocks of
capital and debt, and last period's profit flow.
Assuming that there are no costs of adjustment, the
specification of the firm's investment decision is given by:
Maximize
0  = O[G(R(I;z), K(I;ti) 1, S (.“;;$ f(x;n~(ir(I;dP)) ro’) drr, D(I;fi - B(I; B, 1 1 (3a)
Subject to
IlO (3b)
Thus, an investment-induced G-S tradeoff is the essence of
the firm's optimization problem. The G-S tradeoff is best
understood by examining G,= G,R, + Gx and S, = S,F, + QD', where
GR > 0, GK > 0, SF < 0 and S,,tO are preference weights for the R,
K, F and D' subobjectives.
Given our above discussion of the sign indeterminacy of F,15
and R, and thus S, and G,, the nature of the tradeoff is
undetermined. However, it is shown in Appendix C that the first
order conditions for (3) and the assumptions that PO< 0 and
P,sOt restrict S,< 0 and Gr> 0 in the neighborhood of
equilibrium: an investment-induced G-S tradeoff is operational.
The mechanics of the tradeoff are straightforward. A one unit
increase in I increases G, and thus utility, either through a
simultaneous increase in both firm size and net revenues or an
increase in firm size that outweighs, in utility units, a decline
in net revenues. At the same time, marginal I decreases S either
through a simultaneous increase in the probability of short-term
financial strife and long-term debt dependency or an increase in
long-term debt dependency that outweighs, in utility units, the
decline in F.
The dependence of 0 in equation (3a) on multiple objectives
(G and S) and subobjectives (R,K,F, and D') requires that
management's relative subjective ranking of these objectives and
subobjectives be made explicit. For simplicity, it is assumed
that S and G are linear in their arguments:
SFF = +,I= S,I= Gsuz= G,= GxR= 0. In contrast, the relative
preference ordering for G and S is variable and endogenous. It
is assumed that O,= O,= 0, while O,,<O: the firm's imperative
to grow is a constant unyielding commitment that is independent
of the size of the firm, while the firm's response to financial
security and uncertainty is variable. In particular, at lower
levels of financial security management responds to the threat of16
encroachment on its decision-making autonomy and the possible
threat to the firm's immediate and long-run survival by choosing
an investment/debt strategy which focuses on restoring financial
security even at the expense of maintaining or promoting the
firm's growth objective. A financially fragile firm will
sacrafice  potential growth to lower the probability of crisis.
As in the credit rationing literature, financial structure
influences investment. I is inversely related to the debt-equity
ratio. However, in this Keynesian model credit affects I through
the demand side. Note that the intensity of the G-S tradeoff is
variable. Ceteris paribus, at higher levels of I (and thus
higher levels of G and lower levels of S) the relative preference
for security increases.
III. The Optimal Investment Stratesv
The first order condition for an interior solution to
maximization problem (3) is O,G,=-O,S,  or alternatively
0, [G,R,+G,K,~  +o,[s,~,+s,~~1 =o
The firm invests to the point where the marginal utility gains
(losses) from growth are exactly offset by the marginal utility
losses (gains) from financial security/autonomy. In equilibrium
sgn(-s,) = SW($) -- the firm faces a G-S tradeoff. The exact
nature of the tradeoff is discussed below.
The second order condition for a maximum requires that:
O&z + G,O,, 'O,S,,+ S,O,, < 0
Recognizing that O,, = O,,S, and that O,,=O&l=O,  the second order
condition can be stated as:17
(4) ‘G GII + 0, s,, + S12 o,, < 0
This condition is met if
GII = GR (l-fl)& < 0 and S,, = SF [& f (p-1) 1 < 0 or
alternatively if x& = Qr2 [Q.P= + 2P. ] < 0 where g is the dividend
payout rate.14 Thus under our assumptions that PO < 0 and Pa7 g 0
the second order
In Appendix
and G, > 0 in the
condition holds.
C, we show that a strong condition for s, < 0
neighborhood of equilibrium is a minimal
preference for the firm's size subobjective. Assuming that this
preference exists, the nature of the G-S tradeoff is such that
management must sacrifice financial security to obtain growth and
vice-versa.
The managerial firm's optimal I decision is summarized by
Figure I. In finding the I' that ensures G,(I) = -+sr (I)
G
management must resolve the G-S tradeoff. At levels of I < I~
marginal increases in I increase gross profits by enough to (1)
offset the marginal increments in the costs of autonomy and thus
ensure that G rises (G, > 01, and (2) ensure that F declines by
enough, despite the increase in financial obligations (X), to
offset the increase in D', thus S increases and (3) increase the
relative preference weight, 0,
0,
assigned to the G objective as
safety increases and thus 0, declines. Thus for I < I,,O, > 0:
total utility increases with I. For I,< I < I, marginal
increases in investment result in smaller increases in gross
profits as the firm's profit per unit decreases at higher levels
of output. As a result, xf offsets the marginal increments inFigure I: the optimal solution and G-S and R-K tradeoffs
c
. ‘(G,) 1 (Gla effect)
Figure II: the effect of dar on optimal I18
the costs of autonomy by less -- G, declines -- and is no longer
capable of reducing F by enough to offset the rise in D' -- s,
becomes negative. 0 In addition, 2 declines.
0,
to rise but at the expense of a decline in S
tradeoff is operable. As long as G,)-2 S,,
G
Thus G continues
(S,<O) : the G-S
marginal increments
in I will increase 0. But, given that IC$ < 0 (which ensures
that S, < 01, G,* < 0, and O,, < 0, beyond I' marginal increments
to I will no longer generate enough profits to ensure that the
appropriately weighted increase in G offsets the increasingly
more heavily weighted declines in S.
Depending on the specific nature of the - $S1 and G,
G
functions, the firm may also sacrifice net revenue in order to
increase the size of the firm. While there are many different
sets of circumstances under which this tradeoff may be operable,
the most obvious one is the case of a financially robust firm.
In this situation, 0, is small even at higher levels of I, thus
the relative preference weight assigned to,the negative values of S,
is small and marginal increments to I beyond the point where
R1 = 0 are likely to be utility enhancing. In the extreme case
where 0, = 0 for all I, I' satisfies G, = 0. Thus I*=I,>I,.
Thus an important connection between the two tradeoffs
facing the firm becomes apparent: when the growth objective
dominates the security objective, the firm is more likely to
pursue growth to the point where net revenues are traded off for
size -- R,<O. In particular, as the intensity of the G-S
tradeoff declines beyond a particular point the intensity of the19
R- K tradeoff increases. For the financially fragile firm,
where security objectives dominate growth objectives,
restrictions on I make it likely that R, > 0. In this situation
our model reproduces the NPV > 0 result of the irreversible
investment literature (surveyed in Pindyck(l991)). The
possibility that either one or both tradeoffs are operable and
thus R, '( 0 or, (1-p) zf'( A, further distinguishes our model from
the neoclassical theory of I -- the optimal level of I can be
greater or less than in neoclassical theory. It includes as a
special but extremely relevant case the solution associated with
irreversible investment models.
IV. Comparative Statics
In this section, the comparative static effects of
Q,E,~~,u~,~,P~,~  and p are discussed. Detailed derivations
are contained in Appendix D.
In general the effect on I' and K* of a one unit change in
any parameter, p, (with the exception of Ko, discussed below)
can be expressed as
(5)
where 0,=0 is invoked, IHI is the second order condition in
equation (4), and O* is written as SpOss. Given that IHI<O, the
sign of c depends on the sign of three separate effects:
d.
O&-, OsSrpI and SISpOss. These effects respectively represent:
(1) the change in investment-induced increases in growth
objectives evaluated in utility terms by'0,: (2) the change in20
investment-induced reductions in financial security evaluated in
utility terms by 0,: and (3) the change in the evaluation of the
investment-induced reduction in financial security (S,) as a
result of changes in the preference weight Osp=(SPOss)  that occur
as S changes. Given that O,>O, O,>O, O,<O, and S,<O in the
neighborhood of equilibrium, the sign of& depends on the signs
of Grp, SD, and SP.
The comparative static results are best understood by
recognizing that each of these three effects alters the intensity
of the G-S tradeoff. Unambiguous increases in the intensity of
the tradeoff (any combination of Grp< 0 or S,<O or S,<O) will
result in less I and conversely.
To show how the model works, we consider in detail a change
in Q, the firm's profit markup. Changes in Q are the primary
channel through which real sector developments directly affect
the pace of accumulation of the model. dI/da can be expresses
as
g=_ [C7,&&-~)~~,,) + 0, CS,f (P-1)  XT@ 1 + s&qrs, (P-1) Pf) 1
da pi (6)
where XT== f&(l+pPm>. If demand increases such that P-2 0 and
&>Or then G&O, S,,>O and S,>O implying that g> 0
da *
A rise in a stimulates I three ways. First, it increases
the marginal return to growth -- marginal gross profits are
increased because the additional output is sold at a higher a,
marginal costs remain the same, and the marginal decline in price
when Q grows is either unaffected or reduced. Second, it reduces
the marginal decline in safety because F is reduced. Third, it21
increases the level of S through higher gross profits that reduce
F, and thereby lower the weight on the investment-induced decline
in S. All three effects reduce the intensity of the G-S tradeoff
and result.in  optimal trades of investment-induced reductions in
S in favor of investment-induced increases in G. Thus, I
increases. As can be seen in Figure II, the first (or demand)
effect shifts the G, curve to the right while the latter effects (s_> c
and S,> 0) both shift the - +S1
G
This result is important on
On the micro level, it shows how
curve to the right.
both the micro and macro levels.
shifts in demand and cost
functions change I demand. On the macro level, it provides a
feedback mechanism through which macroeconomic variables shift
the firm's demand and cost functions and thus influence
microeconomic profitability and I.
We next consider the effect of Da, the initial level of
debt, on I'. Changes in Do affect I in our model because they
change S. Since S,, (the only shift parameter (in Figure II)
that is operable in this case) is negative, dI/dW<O. An
increase in Do raises D and X and thus reduces the level of
financial security by increasing both F and 0'. As a result the
preference weight assigned to the investment-induced reduction in
S is increased.
The unknowability of the future is reflected in u2, a




S, is positive because a rise in ,? (and thus in22
8) means that management feels more secure at any given debt
level. Moreover, because S rises with E, investment-induced
reductions in safety cause smaller declines in utility. Finally,
I causes a smaller reduction in S at higher E levels because the
"acceptable" debt to debt-plus-equity ratio has risen.
It is shown in Appendix D that, in general, * < 0. There
do2
are two exceptions, however. If a firm's financial condition is
either extremely robust (with S so high that (l-P)xf < A,, or the
growth-profits tradeoff is operable) or is extremely fragile
(where debt is so high that X> ~EI, or an autonomy crisis is
likely), then d-r > 0.
da2
For the extremely robust firm, a rise in u2
which reduces the probability of all undesirable profit outcomes
(or all n<X), lowers the probability of the net additional
undesirable profit outcomes associated with F,>O. Thus
~,,~<o, S,,,>O and the firm's utility maximizing opportunities are
enhanced as uncertainty rises. For the very fragile firm, S,,>O
-- security actually rises as the level of uncertainty increases.
In this case the reduction in the probability of existing
undesirable outcomes outweighs the addition of new undesirable
outcomes and F&>O: the only hope for a firm that faces
relatively certain bankruptcy lies in the additional desirable
outcomes associated with an increase in u2 which provide a
chance, however slim, for survival. Put differently, a firm on
the verge of bankruptcy will take an investment gamble that an
ordinary firm would not consider. Ceteris paribus, this increase
in security induces an increase in I.23
Given that u2, E and xg or Q are all conditional on the
existing information set, additional adverse information
generated by the passage of time might (depending on the exact
nature of expectation formation) reduce Q and ,!? and increase
02, thus causing a reduction in I. In addition, the sequential
nature of decision making in our model implies that a reversal in x
in subsequent periods would result in a revival of investment.
Thus our model can reproduce the '*waiting to invest" result of
the irreversible investment literature.
We now consider the effect of a change in P, the initial
stock of illiquid capital, on I' and K'. (Note that
dI=dK_1)
3 &O - In neoclassical models with reversible
investment dK* - = 0 because the same user cost is applied to old
dP
and new capital. Under the assumption of illiquid capital,
however, the use of P is "free" in the sense that the costs of
autonomy associated with fl are fixed or sunk costs. Marginal
profit per unit of P is larger than that associated with I
because I has variable costs of autonomy. The greater the
proportion of K' represented by fl as opposed to I, the lower D
(given Do) and the higher S. Thus, dK'/ &" > 0. The effect of
Ko on I' cannot be determined a priori because may be : 1.
Another noteworthy characteristic of the model is that cash
flow is positively related to I :*>o.
d7r"
(If the model was
extended to include a stock of liquid assets, this stock would
also be positively related to I.) Given the relation between D
and z" discussed in Appendix A, this result is qualitatively the24
dI same as the - result discussed above.
dDa
Thus, our model
generates the major theoretical relation empirically tested and
confirmed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988). While Fazzari
et. al. assume that the cash flow (or debt-equity) effect on I is
generated on the supply side of financial markets, the relations
they estimate are reduced form
between the demand side effect
influences of theirs.
equations which cannot distinguish
of our model and the supply side
These comparative static results can serve as a
microfoundation for Minsky's financial theory of investment
instability. In particular, the results associated with the
expectational (7Por u), attitudinal (E and u2), and financial
variables (r, Do and x0) can be used to model the main
characteristics of post-war business cycles in a manner
consistent with Minsky's work. In our concluding section, we
outline how this can be accomplished.
Finally, it can be shown under reasonable assumptions that
changes in the interest rate, the purchase price of a unit of
capital, or the rate of depreciation have the expected effect on
I'. I5
V. Conclusion
The comparative static properties of the model suggest that
it is a sensible or reasonable formulation of the problem. They
also demonstrate that this model of the firm can be used to
underpin Minsky's theory of cyclical investment instability.25
In the model, investment is affected by three distinct
clusters of variables: (1) variables that reflect subiective
manaserial attitudes -- 0,/O,, E, 7P(K) (which reflects
management's optimism
reflects management's
meaningfully); (2) variables that describe the financial status
of the firm -- Do, the initial stock of debt, Y, the firm's
liquid assets, and r, the interest rate; and (3) CC, the profit
about future market growth), and 4' (which
confidence in its ability to forecast
markup determined in the real sector of the economy. An
advantage of our model as a microfoundation for Minsky's
financial theory of the investment cycle, then, is its rich menu
of subjective and financial variables. Because of space
constraints, we limit our discussion of the role of the model in
a Minsky cycle to the behavior of investment at the cycle's end-
of-expansion, onset-of-crisis stage.
In the mid-expansion phase of a Minsky cycle investment
spending rises rapidly because boom euphoria raises managerial
optimism and confidence (zg rises due to revised estimates of
future aggregate demand while 6' falls). Boom euphoria may also
dampen management's concern with safety (0,/O, may rise). f,
the maximum acceptable leverage ratio, either creeps up (if the
boom is modest) or leaps up (if the boom is expected to be long
and vigorous): the firm is now willing to use debt-finance more
aggressively. Working against these developments, we may see a
modest rise in r and in Do (as borrowing outstrips cash-flow and
the financing gap widens). However, according to Minsky and26
Keynes (1936; CH 221, changes in the subjective variables will
dominate any modest objective deterioration in the firm's
financial status in the heat of the boom and investment spending
will accelerate.
Both Keynes and Minsky blame the onset of recession on some
combination of rising interest rates and the inevitable
disappointment of the euphoric profit expectations of the mid-
expansion. Bouyant profit expectations (reflected in I~Q)
confidently held (i.e., with low 0) may have outpaced IE,
realized profits. (Keep in mind that a is assumed constant and
therefore cannot rise in Minsky's model, while it may fall in
Keynes's.) Therefore, the firm must now make downward revisions
in its profit expectations just as interest payments rise
unexpectedly. If its forecasts errors are large enough,
management might lose confidence in its ability to make
meaningful forecasts (so 6* might explode). Meanwhile, it will
have to adjust downward its estimate of  ,?? and will see its
liquid assets erode (or Y fall).
As these developments depress I*, desired investment, actual
investment expenditures will be sustained for some time by the
need to complete unfinished projects. Thus, the need to borrow,
even at high interest rates will continue right into the
recession. I* will now be ready to collapse, leading the economy
into a downward spiral of uncertain, historically contingent
dimensions. For example, if 15 is low enough and Do is high
enough, or the typical firm is financially "fragile," a financial27
panic might take place.
The model developed here can also reproduce the other phases
of Minsky's business cycle. And its set of investment
determinants is rich enough to enable it to "explain" business
cycles with distinct patterns. Of course, we have paid a price
for this richness. The theory is too complex to find
incorporation in a formal, mathematical business cycle model and
the problem as we have posed it seems to elide any simple,
mathematically elegant formulation. Nevertheless, we believe
that the benefits outweigh the costs. And we hope that our
efforts will stimulate others to develop more attractive models
of the enterprise investment decision in a Keynes-Minsky setting.Appendix A
In this appendix we formally specify the financing and debt
structures described in the body of the paper. The
representative firm is modelled as a net debtor with no liquid
assets and with only two sources of investment finance: Y, the
internal funds or cash-flow carried over from last period
(y=xo-xo) and if Y<PxTg, new debt (AD). If Y>PK19, the
residual goes to debt reduction. All debt is assumed to be
variable rate consols.
The firm's level of debt is thus given by
D = D0+(PKr+6PKX(I;Xo))-Y (Al)
where 6 is the rate of depreciation and (PKI+6PKX)=PKIg. The
interest cost, direct and/or opportunity, associated with PKIg
is rPKIQ=rPKI=r6PKX which is equivalent to X, the current cost
of autonomy in a world without dividends.
The application of present valuation rules to rPKIg given
the independence of X’ in successive periods leads to the
particular form of A in equation (2). Abstracting for the moment
from dividend payments,
A=rPKI+i5PKX=r(Do-Y)
While the independence of succesive  X's implies the independence
of replacement investment (6X), it also establishes a dependence
between net investment (I) in successive periods -- a one unit
increase in current period I must reduce I in the next period by
an equivalent amount in order to preserve the independence of the
K's . Thus, the current financing of 6K generates an infinitestream of debt payments (rap%) with a present value of 6PKK,
while the net effect of financing I is limited to a one time,
current period, debt payment rPxI -- the future stream of debt
payments associated with I is offset by the equivalent reduction
in the debt payments associated with I in the next period.
Therefore, when dividends are zero the present discounted value
of : (1) debt payments associated with Ig; and (2) total debt
payments or total current costs of autonomy, X, reduces
respectively to rPKI+&PKK and rPkI+6PKK+r(Do-Y) where r(D"-Y)
can be interpreted as a onetime fixed or sunk cost of fl
generated from the carry-over debt (Do-Y) associated with P.
Finally, to preserve the consistency of the static problem
in equation (1) with the dynamic problem under our simplifying
assumption (in Appendix B) requires that expected dividend
payments be defined as a percent of gross profits minus last
period's interest payments rather than current interest payments:
p (A"-rD") where O<p<l. We model dividends in this manner to
avoid the reintroduction of minor future effects -- R' would
depend on both the D and K trajectories -- that could disrupt the
independence of K in successive periods. Including expected
dividend payments as a current cost of autonomy implies that
X=rP'CI+r6PxK(I;KO)+r(Do-Y)+p(ng-rDo)
and that Y=x"-Xo=xo-~Do-~(~o-r~o).  Substituting for Y in equation
(Al) results in a fuller specification of current debt:
D=(l+(l-p)r)D"+PKI+bPKK(I;KO)-(1-0)x0
Incorporating dividend payments and the cash-flow relation, Y,
2expected net revenues -- expected gross profit flows minus
expected present value of the costs of autonomy associated
1" -- can now be fully specified as
the
with
R= (1-P) Ag(K(r;P) ) - [rPKI+8PKK(I;KO) +(1-P) (r(DO (l+r) -I+9 > I
Given the complete specification of X, A, and D, the series
of parameter vectors referred to in the text can be written as:
~=(~,r,PX,Do,rco,~),~=(r,P”,b,Do,~o,~,~o),~=(a2,~),
~=(~J,D~,P~JS,~,~F~)  and &=(&Pr,@).
The firm's full optimization problem becomes equation (3)
subject to the specifications of R, A, X and D in this appendix.
3appendix B
In this AFpendl, '-c we develope  the relationship between the full
dynamic control problem suqcrested in Section I, the equivalent C:._nami:
mcdel under the three simplif?in? assumptions made in Section 1. and
the equivalent static model examined in the body of the paper.
The full dynamic model can be expressed as
Maximize







where R' is the present discounted value of the net revenue stream
wer the planning horizon (t = 1 . . . T), K' is a time-weighted
average of the firm's real capital stock, i? and ? are the capital
stock and net investment trajectories from t = 1 . , . T. i?tcl 3rd d
i+ -3-l are the K and I traiectories  from t = 1 . . . t + i, the sequent?
'Zf S functions represent S in sucessive  time periods, and all
subscripts refer to time periods.
In this specification. all future effects of current I decisions,
on G and S are included.
Under simplifying ass -umption (2) and the respecification of J.
elaborated in Section I, which preserves the dynamic nature cf the
firm's S objectives in a world in which future effects are  unknorxabl+,
problem (81) reduces toMaximize
.:ubject to (Bib),. (Blc) and (Eld).
In this specification, the firm chooses K, for +I = 1 , . . T i-s
a
Jptimizc (B2). K1 is chosen to satisfy  the G and S objectives nf the
firm, vhile K, . . . L we chosen LI L to satisfy only the t'ir;n'; rJ
Jbjcctives. Assuming that the respecification of S adequately
cspturcs the firm's inherently dynamic S objectives under assumption
,? ‘Y ,, 1 as is argued in the text, problem (BZ) can be considered
to be equivalent under our core and subsidiary assumptions to problem
{El).
TJnder assumption (3) in Section I, K: and KL - ++i are independent 4
for all i. In particular K: f Kt+i a- for all i ? 0. IJnder assumption
(1). only the 1('1 element of the Kt traiectory is implemented _'
implying that the maximization of (82) with respect to the firm's
lrrowth objectives is equivalent to the maximization of the tirm's
current growth objectives which in turn are a function of current
expected net revenues CR) and the current size !K) of the firm.
Treating the relation between K and 1 implicitly. problem (E2: is
equivalent to problem (1) or problem (3) in the text.
Accepting the specification of dividends as B(fl-p.'i in order to
nvoid the introduction of minor future effects, letting T =  *), and
recognizing differences in the specification Of R, in problem  (~2) and
.,
R in problem  (3) that result respectively from the explicit and
implicit treatment of the relation between K and I and thus th?
interdependence of I+ and I a t+j. {implied by the independence of K+ XI<
_
I< & 0-c j, i in each problem, it can readily be she-wn that the first c,rder,:onditions  f!or K,; in Froblem !B3,) are equivalent to the first 11-&r
conditions for 1 in (3).
An extended appendix l vJith this proof is available upon ruq;:ez~
from the suthsrs. For the interested reader the differences in I?, L,-
_.
fE2) ,and R in !3). necessary to set up this proof. follow.
P _.
t,
‘= Il-B)Jp’K+b - [rPKI+rtiP  K+(l-E)(r!D'fl+r-II'iil nK i 2: ; d
E = (1+HI~~K!I;K% 1 - CrPI~I+~PRK!I:R~~+!l-~~~r~D~~l+r-~~~~l ;E4,
The similar. although  different after discounting. treatment of
the interest payment s associated with net investment. (rPK1j, results
from the treatment of the interdependence of I, xnd I+
< ~+i in ptxblem
fB2) via the first order conditions. while the difference in the
treatment of the interest pavments associated with replacement
investment ! ( r&PKK)  vs. (SF'K!) results from the independence XT K,
and Ktci znd the use of discounting in problem (B2). The proof
‘follows from the application of the first order conditions associated
-Jith the theory of optimal control of dynamic systems to problem (EZ!
-Jhere (1) the interdependency between I, and I+
* _ +i and the independtnce
gf K t and Kt+i xnd (2! the specific  functional forms for I?+ in 'E3! I F
A a
and D' in the text and K' = Z yt-lK+
t-1 ., -with 0 ( y ! 1 are inccrPsrst?d.
The first order conditions for K 1 in problem (B2) are equivalent to
the first order conditions for problem (3) presented in Section Iii.Tn this Appendix.  we consider a proposition that establishes ~.h?
rjiqs ot-s T and GT in equilibrium and thus the exact nature ,of r,he
tradeoff bekxeen G and S. Two cases are considered: ! 1 ) c = Ij ; a,::; i **-L
!7\ c &,, Y > 0.
Fronosition:
Define Il* I?, I?. and IL d as the I levels at which S T/T1! 5 c,
r JT(T~) = 0, F II,i '2,
W I, = 9. .and GTIICi = - e S /I+', *
condition (1) as S
G T
Define
II ' 0 and GTT ' 0 for 11 II. I _'_ I?,
GK and condition (2) as y
,pK
(-3
', 5(1-r). If 6 = 9 and condition !l)
holds, GT'I+~ ? 0 and EI~I&\ ' 9. If 5 ? r3 and conditions (11
and (2) hold, a strorg set of conditions is met for GTIILi \ 9
and ST/I*) ( 0.
Proof:
Case I
Vnder the assumptions on the demand curve (P
2 ' 0 and
r2~ L g), STT y 0 and GIT ’ 0. Thus condition 11, hclds.
TIT
_\t I 3 , r 1 pK
-I
T c!l-e)F -
- rF’1 + Gp = 111
\ cr the marqinal profit
lsi?
rate on investment L
FK
Tr%,i ( T[r:xp = &* Given that ITIT ’ 0 for ,111 1. thprp
exists a level of investment, Tl J IT. r
; a -dhere II'(I) = T
L-b’ :l,t T;, d
c -2-p =
L t+CcnrFKf@-l)+rFKlf7  + C ,DfC1-L*3 ?I' reduces to SD' c1_;17$
' 9 and GT = r~ \. 0, . Since ST/I) is a continuous function.
:TT I I ~ :
_. c 0 and STT ’ 0 then T, ’ I, ’ I,.
L Given that
'* .:T: I j f 0 for I ? I,
1’
and rJIIIi ? !) fg3,r I ( I,, StfIi \ tj
I
f3r 1 ! Tl and GI/I) ( 0 for I ) I,. the requirement that
TC satisfy sqn C-SIfrtii = s;rn GI'T*\ imPlies 1: ; I* ’ I_
&
lnd that GTII &
: 'I  rJ and E,: I&.' / rj_
iZonditicn  !li holds as in Case I. If the firm has a minimal
:Dncern (preference) for the size of the firm subobjecti:??.
then condition !Zi holds. Assuming this preference e:ii~tz~
It must be emphasized that the minimal preference for
!;bfective is a strong condition. As 5 + 1 the movement of






1 0 and SI \ r> is offset not only by a minimal preference for  size
that increases GIlI) fGc;r all I but by the shift in SIfSIs  ( 0). Given
the difficulty in comparing ICI,1 and isIS., the stronger condition lc
invoked.
TJsinq realistic values for 5 and r -- 6 = .08 and r = .l --
condition (2! requires that the response of G for a one dollar
increase in PKK is l/14 of the response in G for a one dollar increase
in F!. Thus. a mild preference for the size subobjective is suffici-rnf
to satisfy this strong condition. In COmpariSOn  to GK = 9, the
existence of a preference for size implies that I, is greater -- 3r-l a _
the basis of G objectives alone, the
Try1,i is smaller and is more likely +
is more likely to be less than I?.
firm will invest more. Thus,
to be less than lTTf13\. and IT'In this SPDendix the _ _ comparative d%atic results and rondlti;zns
iizcussed in Section IV are formall-r 3eriVeVed. Total differentLAr:f-:- --LA.









iHI = LHE equation (4) ( 0
3ettinq the appropriate terms equal to zero and solving 53r






~~?le now .z!msider -, ‘I cj_
CicG
-.-en that f 7 = -'
,y - ib_a)?





??A=, necessary Ind sufficient condition for S ?' (1 i3 3'1
17’ T I
&L I+% j







“)~r:(~T= b+a p - * Thus a strong set of
_
dI -onditions for - ’ Cl io C 1 ) IT’;’ ‘\ rFk+E,)
e$ 1 - e*
md (2, x 2 ITT.
EecqTnizinq that it is possible for IX L IIT xLf_ lnw levels of I !hi,gh
- ’ ,! requires that  I, ’ 1 ; 1: tgr tha.t, t,l-p fj_r_m’s financial
rl,z _’
position is neither extremely robust !such that S
IO?
) 0) nor
extremely fragile !such that S
$
.: oi. Assuming +-hat the
respresentati7e  firm's financial position is captured by this
deocri.Ftion. then K 9. If it
? do2
is .assumed that the direct effc?ct
9f 7- ?n SI 'S ?: dominates its affect on 0, 'c),,S ,) then the
IT:' .a U;;
31 . . 7-
rtron!y ~:nndi?ion for -
do2
r! retiuces to ronditizn !2\.in Che stocj: ,Jf debt. This conditizn is ~~~remel;c  likplw to A-.~~ f~;r -;.-
1 ..- -* _ .A1
espresentati7e  firm. Th.c?s. 11
fi rj requires no restriciti7e 3ss'JT~CloRZ .
Finally, the larcre increase in admissable debt when FK increases
by 3 IlnZt ! ik) implies that, E$T is sig indeterminant. &A st.ron?
31 ,:ondition for -
iFK
’ 0 is that !OSs p?l ) !“cf3~+
IF-.
Fpl -- the dirSC: . __
effect of F" 3n E, L dominates the preference xeiSyht change effect_.1
9
-3er Crotty ( 1390) for an analysis c,f the eontrz5tiny view: sf
Ke:,-nes and Minskp on this issue.
%he market value of the firm, he told UJ, "is the outcome of :h?
m339 psycholoT] of a 1arTe number of icrnorant individuals" !i936.
r;. 154). L
4Ev avoidinu the conflation of o.wnership and management ve ~lz:c
~110~ f&r %he theoretical po ssibility of partially autonomous and
noTl-,j+ c.--nchronic developments in the real and financial sectors of th?
economy.
::Zee Cyert and Hendrick (19721. Marris and Meuller (1'3801 and
Nilliamson mei) for surveys of manaqcrial and behavioral theories .>r-
the firm.
In recent gears neoclassical financial economists concerned -.A.~?,
the agency costs associated with conflicts betr;een owners and manac;er;
have adopted a traditional "managerial" view of the objective function
of the enterprise. For example. Jensen t1988) has argued that
"manaaers have incentives to expand their firms beyond the size that
maximizes shareholder wealth. Growth increases managers' power b:r
increasina the resouces under their control, and changes in management
-ompensation are positively related to growth. Moreover. the tenden,:::
5f firms to reward middle managers through promotion rather than
t,hrouah year-to-year bonuses also creates an organizational bias
tl-zzari Trowth to supply the new positions that such promotion-haze,?
reward systems require" (1388, p. 25). For a general discussion of
the effects of owner-manager conflict cln the investment decision of
the firm, see Crotty (1990).
Lazonick's (19911 recent history of the evolution of the
srganizational  structure of the business enterprise argues that WE
business has been "managerial" rather than neoclassical in t'orm and
behavior since the 1920s. ^__"_ Indced. he refers to the US economic =,:;,,~m
from the 1920s to the Frcsent as "managerial capitalism."
%he ioint maximization of R'
xor,-Ah objective
and I<' best represents man;caem.?n: :
because the maximization of l?' with minimum size ;z-
6he acrumulation of a larq productive capacity with poor profit
pt-osp?cts ,do no {Tuarantce long-run survival in a dynamic cemFetiti-:s
3n7ironment. Laryer firms have easier access to financial markets.
xnd econc,mics of scale in research and development and in markzrir,:?.
Fkally. control of a lk3rF:e firm confers incon?, status and power .ZRmanagement. See Donaldson and Lorsch (i3E?) for raze-study: evidence
chat supports our specification of the firm's <growth objective.
-It is Tommon in the neoclassical investment literature to reduce
1 dynamic problem to a static one. US_e, for example, Jorgenson's 123
rents? price mcdel. 2rrch models are static because the az3um~ lzlnz SF
perfect .:ertzinty and!.3r in-zctnent reversibilit:,- e1Fminat.e
on tie other i- 1;
u-i:.-
intertempcral profit tradcctf. Our reduction. I- Lci -C.
clsults from the combined assumptions of illiquid capital anr
Keynesian uncertainty.
'We specify the firm's
in this
short-term expectations cf Frofitability
-day solely in order to make the anallrtics of our model
tractable. Under Keynesian uncertainty rational aaents could never
formulate such a complete distribution and, even if they could, they
-4ould never have complete confidence that it represented the whole
truth about likely future state of the world. Since all such
forecast3 are built on hopes, fears and social conventions of various
kinds, they can never attain even the subjective status of knowledg?.
'Even so, the model as is, constitutes a more Keynesian than
neoclassical formulation of the problem because the illiquidity of
capital causes the investment decision to be constrained by the
existing financial structure of the firm.
lONote that thi3 formulation of the index of long-term
-rulnerability stresses the threat to autonomy from creditors and
excludes the threat posed by shareholders.
'%Jote that while D chancres 310~1~ over time, 6 is subject to
dramatic shifts at times of unforeseen-chancre. 3uch a3 the &set of an
llnexpected recession or a financial market panic, when events reveal
that the firm's expectations -3ere in serious error. Investment .iemand
itaelt -dould then experience dramatic 3hirt3 as dell.
12c ,uppcse the firm sets 6 bv choosin= a taraet ratio of debt t0
Debt-plus-equity. A dollar used-to buy capital Goods will raise P by
.one dollar because it was financed either by borrowing or by the use
,of internal fund3 that could have been used to retire debt instead.
Eut D Xl1 rise by a fraction equal to the target debt to
debt-plus- equity ration. Since this fraction must be less ttian one,
D' gill ri3e.
12,- or II is distributed normally, qualitatively similar results are
found. Eee n. 15 for a comparison of comparative static results under
these two alternative assumptions on f.
l%hile thi3 derivation of JTTIinvokes the production function
assumption that Q,, = 0, all derivations and proor‘z that follow hold
for the more general case zhere Q,, i 0.15$xlli tat L-:ely similar results to those derived in this 3ectio.n
hold for the case vhere IT is distributed normally. In particulnr. t.h*e
csmFarstive static results for It. r. and F" hold under the same
conditions, while the remaining results require only mar~ginail:- more
restrictive conditions: dI!du b 0 requires as a strong condition
IT? :\ 0; dI!dD' ' 9 requires as a strong condition lT'$ ) 0 and X : IT’?.
With the exception of dI/do', the remaining comparative static results
are qualitatively similar if IlT&f(ll=X) 1 ! 1 lT?fKg(n=XJC?T-K~l
+ X&ffi fIT=X) I crJhere p i- 3 any relevant parameter. This condition i-.
shown to hold in all cases for realistic parameter values. In
addition dI!da' ’ 0 requires as 3 strong condition that IIg ? rF"'l-ES
and X < lTg - .T. A technical appendix that derives these results iz
available upon request from the authors.References
Crotty, J. R., "Owner-Manager Conflict and Financial Theories
of Investment:
Minsky,"
A Critical Evaluation of Keynes, Tobin and
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Summer, 12:4,
1990, 519-42.
Cyert, R. M. and Hendrick, C. L., "Theory of the Firm: Fast,
Present, and Future; An Interpretation," Journal of Economic
Literature, 10:2, 1972.
Delli Gatti, F. and Galligati, M., "Financial
Income Distribution,
Institutions,
and the Stock Market," Journal ofPost
Kevnesian Economics, 1990, 356-74.
Donaldson, G. and Lorsch, J., Decision Makins at the Too: The
Shapinq of Stratesic Direction, New York: Basic Books Inc.,
1983.
Fazzari, S, M., Hubbard, R. G., and Petersen, B. C.,
"Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment,"
Brookinqs Paners on Economic Activity, 1988:1, 141-95.
Jarsulic, M., "Endogenous Credit and Endogenous Business Cycles,"
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1989, 35-48.
Jensen, M., "Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1988, 2(l), 21-48.
Keynes, J. M.,
Cambridge:
The General Theory of Income, Interest and Money,
Cambridge University Press, 1972 [1936].
Lazonick, W., Business Orqanization and the Myth of the Market
Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Marris, R. and Mueller, D. C.,
and the Invisible Hand,"
"The Corporation, Competition
18:1, 1980.
Journal of Economic Literature,
Minsky, H., Stabilizins an Unstable Economy_, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1986.
Minsky, H., Can "It" Happen Aqain?,
1982.
M.E. Sharpe: Armonk, N-Y.,
Minsky, H., John Maynard Keynes, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1975.
Pindyck, R., "Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment,"
Journal of Economic Literature, September 1991, 1110-1148.Semmler, W. and Franke, R., "Debt Financing of Firms, Stability,
and Cycles in a Dynamic Macroeconomic Growth Model." In E.
Nell and W. Semmler, eds, Nicholas Kaldor and Mainstream
Economics, Macmillan, 1991.
Semmler, W., "A Macroeconomic Limit Cycle with Financial
Perturbation," Journal of Behavior and Oraanization,
Skott, P., "On the Modeling of Systematic Financial Fragility,"
mimeo, University of Mass., 1991.
Taylor, L. and O'Connell, S., "A Minsky Crisis," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1985, 871-875.
Vickers, D. Money Capital in the Theorv of the Firm, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Williamson, 0. E., "The Modern Corporation: Origins,Evolution,
Attributes," Journal of Economic Literature, 19:4, 1981.